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Policy determinants of productivity 
growth in Australia * 
Bernard Wonder 
Head of Office, Productivity Commission 
… the Productivity Commission has provided a vital, independent 
source of public information and advice to government on policy 
reforms needed to underpin Australia’s long-term prosperity (Australian 
Treasurer, Peter Costello 2003) 
Introduction 
The transformation in Australia’s economic performance since the early 1990s has 
generated much interest overseas as well as within Australia. The contribution made 
by microeconomic reform in this country has been a particular focus of inquiry by 
officials from foreign governments, national research institutes and international 
and regional economic agencies, not the least in East Asia. This interest reflects not 
only the manner in which the reforms were introduced and sustained but also the 
magnitude of Australia’s reform requirements and the institutions associated with 
reform. 
It was against this background that the Chairman of the Australian Productivity 
Commission, Gary Banks, prepared a detailed assessment of the Australian 
approach to structural reform (Banks 2005). Many of the views expressed by Banks 
are directly relevant to the interests of this conference and hence this contribution 
(particularly the first half) draws extensively on his paper. 
The paper commences with an overview of the turnaround in Australia’s economic 
performance before outlining the broad nature of the microeconomic reform 
program and associated outcomes, as well as the key elements of the reform 
‘strategy’ and its institutional underpinnings. Particular attention is given to the 
contribution made by the Productivity Commission (and its direct predecessors) and 
the important attributes of the Commission enabling its contribution. A risk in such 
a presentation is to over account the significance of the Commission to the extent of 
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reforms. The Productivity Commission is, after all, only an advisor and not a direct 
player or policy decision maker. However, the intention is to outline the Australian 
experience with a view to assisting others make their own assessment of 
institutional frameworks that might help sustain reform efforts in their own 
countries. The Commission’s track record in having much of its advice accepted by 
government in many areas of microeconomic policy demonstrates the potential for 
an agency such as the Commission to make a difference to the course of policy 
development.  
Australia’s economic performance 
Australia began the 20
th Century with the highest per capita income in the world. 
However, being blessed with abundant natural resources was not sufficient to 
guarantee continuing prosperity. It turns out that Australia managed to devise some 
special institutions and policy frameworks that, whatever their initial merits, ended 
up significantly handicapping economic performance.  
Australia’s structural policies following Federation in 1901 were shaped by a social 
compact that came to be known as the ‘Australian settlement’ (Kelly 1992). Four of 
the elements were: 
•  industry protection — protection of domestic industry against imports; 
•  wage arbitration — protection of labour through centralised wage regulation; 
•  White Australia — protection against foreign labour through restrictive 
immigration policies; and 
•  state paternalism — protection against the ‘market’ through state monopoly 
provision of public utility and other services and extensive intervention by the 
state. 
Extensive intervention by government through anti-competitive regulation and 
redistribution policies — captured nicely by the logically flawed expression 
‘protection all round’ — had bi-partisan support and wide community acceptance 
for most of the 20
th Century. For many years the economic costs of this regime were 
masked by the performance of our broad-acre agricultural and mining industries. 
Until the early 1970s, Australia was still managing to ‘ride on the sheep’s back’. 
The terms of trade favoured our primary commodities, and we had benefited from a 
world-wide expansion in demand following World War II. Australians enjoyed 
close to full employment with incomes still higher, on average, than those in most 
other OECD countries. But this did not last.      
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During the 1970s, the prices Australia received for our commodity exports 
commenced a long decline, while the costs of imports began to rise. The resulting 
terms of trade deterioration (Figure 1) would, in turn, expose the underlying 
problem of Australia’s poor productivity performance. 
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Even in the post-war ‘boom’ years, Australia’s productivity lagged. Between 1950 
and 1973, our annual productivity growth averaged 2.6 per cent, compared to 
3.9 per cent for OECD countries as a group (Figure 2). 
Figure 2  Australia’s relative productivity performance 










The reasons for Australia’s relatively poor productivity performance have been 
described as follows: 
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•  indulgent, inflexible work practices, powerful unions and lack-lustre 
management; 
•  outmoded technologies, low rates of innovation and skill development; and  
•  high cost government owned infrastructure services such as power, transport and 
communications, which effectively taxed business users, while cross-subsidising 
households (Banks 2005). 
This poor productivity performance, together with the declining terms of trade, 
translated into a relative decline in living standards. In terms of GDP per person, 
Australia was still ranked 4
th out of 23 OECD countries in 1950, but its position fell 
to 9
th by the early 1970s and to 16
th by the late 1980s.  
Australia’s reform journey 
This realisation forced a re-think of institutional and policy frameworks and 
eventual acceptance of the need to embark on a sustained and comprehensive 
program of trade liberalisation and other structural reforms. A ‘then’ and ‘now’ 
comparison of policy frameworks in Table 1 shows the nature of the changes 
(Henry 2006). In essence, the reforms freed up markets, promoted competition and 
generally sought to ensure that prices did their job of signalling costs and relative 
returns. 
Table 1  Sea change in Australia’s policy frameworks 
1970s  2000s 
Fixed exchange rates  Floating exchange rates 
Capital controls  Capital account and interest rate controls 
liberalised 
High trade barriers  Low trade barriers 
Weak competition policy   Stronger competition policy 
Centralised labour market   Decentralised labour market 
Macroeconomic policy not anchored  Macroeconomic policies credibly anchored to 
medium-term targets  
Of course, this snapshot cannot capture that fact that such a multifaceted reform 
effort was not seamlessly implemented. Nor was it without adjustment costs. For 
example, the 25 per cent across-the-board tariff cut of 1973 turned out to be a one-
off. In conjunction with other events, the cut precipitated a backlash against reform 
and there were only ‘piecemeal’ further reductions in tariffs for over a decade. But 
with Australia’s relatively mediocre economic performance becoming increasingly 
apparent, the early 1980s saw the floating of the Australian dollar (facilitating 
subsequent adjustment to tariff liberalisation) followed by significant liberalisation      
  POLICY DETERMINANTS 
OF PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH IN AUSTRALIA 
5 
 
of the finance sector, including the removal of exchange and interest rate controls. 
The reform of border protection arrangements was also reinvigorated — with the 
conversion or elimination of import quotas as well as reductions in tariffs 
themselves. By 1996, virtually all tariffs (other than for autos and TCF, which were 
on their own liberalisation paths) had fallen to 5 per cent or less.  
A consequence of increased international competition in Australia’s traded goods 
sector was pressure for reductions in input costs, notably in labour markets and 
(non-traded) public utility services. The option for local firms to pass excessive 
input costs onto user industries and consumers was no longer possible once 
accommodating ‘made-to-measure’ increases in border protection stopped.  
The various ‘spot fires’ of microeconomic reform — especially in different sectors 
of economic infrastructure and in different Australian jurisdictions — began to 
coalesce. In 1995, various strands of the structural reform process were consolidated 
and extended in a coordinated National Competition Policy (NCP) agreed to by all 
governments in Australia’s federal system. Among other things, the NCP program 
entailed: an extension of anti-competitive conduct laws to cover previously exempt 
government and unincorporated enterprises; the review of some 1800 items of anti-
competitive regulation; reforms to public monopolies, including ‘competitive 
neutrality’ mechanisms, certain structural reform requirements and prices oversight 
mechanisms where public monopolies were retained; and an access regime for 
network infrastructure (PC 2005a). 
Thus, towards the end of the 20
th Century, Australian governments were committed 
to an increasingly broad-ranging program of domestic microeconomic reform. The 
reforms ultimately embraced all product (goods and services) markets, factor 
markets (including the labour market), and the public and private sectors (Box 1). 
(This ‘micro’ story overlooks the important and complementary role of 
macroeconomic reforms — whose outcomes were low inflation, greater flexibility 
to respond to internal and external shocks, and reduced distortions and improved 
business incentives from tax reforms. But that is a subject in its own right.) 
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Box 1:  Two decades of economic reform 
Trade liberalisation — reductions in tariff assistance (that began in 1973) and the 
abolition of quantitative import controls — mainly in the automotive, whitegoods and 
textile, clothing and footwear industries — gathered pace from the mid 1980s. The 
effective rate of assistance to manufacturing fell from around 35 per cent in the early 
1970s to 5 per cent by 2000. 
Capital markets — the Australian dollar was floated in March 1983, foreign exchange 
controls and capital rationing (through interest rate controls) were removed 
progressively from the early 1980s and foreign-owned banks were allowed to compete 
— initially for corporate customers and then, in the 1990s, to act as deposit taking 
institutions. 
Infrastructure  — partial deregulation and restructuring of airlines, coastal shipping, 
telecommunications and the waterfront occurred from the late 1980s. Across-the-board 
commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation initiatives for government business 
enterprises were progressively implemented from around the same time. 
Labour markets — the Prices and Incomes Accord operated from 1983 to 1996. Award 
restructuring and simplification, and the shift from centralised wage fixing to enterprise 
bargaining, began in the late 1980s. Reform accelerated in the mid 1990s with the 
introduction of the Workplace Relations Act 1996, further award simplification (through 
limiting prescribed employment conditions in enterprise bargaining agreements) and 
the introduction of individual employment contracts (Australian Workplace 
Agreements). 
Human services — competitive tendering and contracting out, performance-based 
funding and user charges were introduced in the late 1980s and extended in scope 
during the 1990s; administrative reforms (for example, financial management and 
program budgeting) were introduced in health, education and community services in 
the early 1990s. 
‘National Competition Policy’ reforms — In 1995, further broad-ranging reforms to 
essential service industries (including energy and road transport), government 
businesses and anti-competitive regulation was commenced by all Australian 
governments through a coordinated national program. 
Macroeconomic policy — inflation targeting was introduced in 1993. From the mid 
1980s, fiscal policy targeted higher national saving (and a lower current account deficit) 
and, from the mid 1990s, concentrated on reducing government debt, primarily 
financed through asset sales (privatisation). 
Taxation reform — capital gains tax and the dividend imputation system were 
introduced in 1985 and 1987, respectively. The company tax rate was lowered 
progressively from the late 1980s. A broad-based consumption tax (GST) was 
implemented in 2000, replacing the narrow wholesale sales tax system and a range of 
inefficient state-based duties. And income tax rates were lowered at the same time. 
Source: Banks (2005). 
 
      
  POLICY DETERMINANTS 
OF PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH IN AUSTRALIA 
7 
 
No single indicator adequately summarises the extent of structural reform in 
Australia. Perhaps one that comes closest is the extent of net assistance to 
Australian industry. The effective rate of assistance for manufacturing has declined 
from 25 to 5 per cent over the past two decades, while agricultural assistance has 
also fallen (Figure 3).  















Other aggregate-style indicators of the extent of structural and behavioural change 
are found in the coincident rise in the trade intensity of Australia’s economy, from 
around 22 per cent in the mid 1980s to 40 per cent now, and the sharp increase in 
business R&D spending as a share of GDP (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4  Increased trade and R&D intensity 
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At the aggregate level, Australia experienced a surge in multifactor productivity 
(MFP) growth during the 1990s, averaging 2.3 per cent, more than double its 
previous rate (Figure 5). Australia’s MFP performance was also among the best in 
the OECD and its labour productivity growth exceeded even that of the USA.  
Figure 5  Australia’s productivity turnaround 





































Accompanied by rising labour utilisation, this translated into annual growth in per 
capita incomes of around 2½ per cent in that decade, well above the previous 
average and that for the OECD as a whole (1.7 per cent). As a consequence, 
Australia has seen its position on the international per capita GDP scale rise from 
16
th to 6
th over the past decade or so (Figure 6). 
Figure 6  Fall and rise of Australia’s economic ranking 
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Australia ranked 4th in 1950
Australia ranked 16th in late 1980s
Australia back to 6th in mid 2000s
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The productivity story was also repeated at the industry level. For example, MFP 
growth in electricity, gas and water jumped by 60 per cent in the 1980s; and the 
MFP growth rate in transport/storage and communications doubled in the 1990s. 
Empirical analysis by the Commission found that the price reductions and 
productivity gains in the infrastructure sector alone yielded a 2½ per cent gain in 
GDP (PC 2005a).  
The reform program also contributed, indirectly, to sharp productivity 
improvements in wholesale trade and the finance and insurance industries, where 
business reorganisation involving the innovative use of ICT was driven by the 
heightened competitive pressures on customers as well as within the industries 
themselves, facilitated by a more accommodating industrial relations framework 
(Johnston et al. 2000; Gretton et al. 2004).  
The Commission has investigated the sources of Australia’s productivity turnaround 
and, like others, concluded that microeconomic policy reforms have played a central 
role. (For a summary of the evidence, see PC 2003a). These reforms, with their 
focus on openness to foreign trade and investment and enhanced domestic 
competition, were the drivers and enablers of productivity growth. Together with 
stable macroeconomic settings for monetary and fiscal policies, the productivity 
surge allowed Australia to pursue higher economic growth and living standards with 
fewer fears of inflationary pressures.  
Reform strategies that worked for us 
While many of Australia’s structural reforms followed standard economic 
prescriptions, the way the reforms were implemented had some features that are 
perhaps more distinctive (Banks 2005). 
‘Opening the borders’ became the first domino 
Opening the borders to foreign goods, services and capital played a critical role in 
exposing inefficiencies elsewhere in the Australian economy as well as building a 
constituency for reforms in government utility service provision and in labour 
market regulation. The prospect of adjustment costs provided the motivation as well 
as a constituency for further reforms that, together with a gradualist approach (see 
below) and a floating exchange rate, ultimately served to contain those costs.  
A key lesson from Australia’s experience is that external liberalisation has distinct 
advantages as a first-mover strategy.      
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We liberalised unilaterally 
Unlike other OECD countries, most of Australia’s trade liberalisation has been 
undertaken unilaterally, rather than in exchange for reciprocal concessions by other 
countries. With agricultural trade — at that time Australia’s main export interest — 
effectively quarantined in the then GATT (now WTO) system, Australia had little 
incentive to do reciprocal deals. This brought into sharp focus the question of 
whether reducing our own import protection would yield national gains, regardless 
of what other countries chose to do. Moreover, Australia generally got ‘credit’ for 
its liberalisation measures in subsequent rounds of multilateral trade negotiations 
while, benefiting from the reciprocal liberalisation of the larger trading powers 
through application of the non-discrimination rule. 
We hastened slowly 
Australia adopted an incrementalist rather than ‘big bang’ approach to reform. The 
experience with tariff cut 25 per cent tariff cut may have reduced the appetite for 
big bang approaches. The cut was not pre-announced by the government, was 
immediate and was explained more in terms of constraining inflation rather than its 
microeconomic benefits. It surprised the inefficient manufacturing sector and was 
soon followed by reversals of protection for ‘sensitive’ sectors and thus a widening 
of disparities in industry assistance. Later tariff liberalisation programs involved 
pre-announced and graduated reductions and made special transition provisions for 
sensitive sectors. 
Australia has also taken a gradual or incremental approach to reform in the other 
key areas.  
•  The reform of public-owned utilities that initially began with commercialisation 
and then corporatisation initiatives in the 1980s were followed by the ‘stronger 
medicine’ of structural separation, removal of entry restrictions against new 
competitors, privatisation (in some jurisdictions), and, for network infrastructure, 
regulated provision for third-party access.  
•  Labour market reforms began with a gradual transition from the traditional, 
highly centralised prescriptive arrangements. Award restructuring and an 
‘accord’ between the government and the unions to limit wage demands gave 
way to enterprise bargaining, and later to the introduction of individual 
employment contracts constrained by limited core requirements.       
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We acted on a broad front 
Notwithstanding the substantial challenges involved, undertaking reform on a broad 
front can reduce resistance to change. Those adversely affected by one reform may 
receive offsetting benefits from reforms in other areas, thus avoiding undue 
adjustment and making reform more ‘palatable’. For example:  
•  The Commission’s modelling of the economy-wide impacts of reducing trade 
barriers while also implementing reforms to energy, communications and the 
public sector, demonstrated that although trade liberalisation alone would reduce 
manufacturing employment by 0.3 per cent, reforms across all the areas would 
increase employment in the manufacturing sector by 1.3 per cent (IC 1996). 
•  While reforms to public utilities have seen apparently regressive price rises for 
households, modelling of the indirect effects on other prices and factor incomes 
has demonstrated net benefits across all household income bands (though greater 
at higher income levels) (PC 2005a). 
We ‘oiled the wheels’ in sensitive sectors 
In the main, Australia used the phasing of reforms to minimise adjustment costs, 
relying on general retraining schemes and the (relatively generous) welfare safety 
net to address the needs of displaced workers. 
However, particularly in sensitive sectors, governments also introduced some 
specific measures to deal with adjustment issues. For example: 
•  The post-2005 TCF plan includes $50 million for this purpose and automotive 
tariff reductions to 2010 have been accompanied by assistance of around $600 
million annually under the Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme 
(PC 2002). 
•  When price support mechanisms in the dairy industry were abolished in 2000, 
existing farmers were provided with a substantial direct compensation financed 
from a levy on milk consumers, to reflect the reduction in the value of their dairy 
holdings and to facilitate adjustment within (or out of) the industry. 
Governments have also provided specific support for regions in which the costs of 
reform were concentrated. For example, the energy reforms of the early 1990s led to 
significant labour shedding from electricity generation in the Latrobe Valley in 
Victoria, which in turn led to a severe downturn in the region. Support has ranged 
from grants to encourage industry relocation to the region, to retraining, and social 
and development initiatives. These measures have contributed to strong 
employment growth since the mid-1990s (PC 2005a).      
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Institutional underpinnings for Australian reforms 
Structural reforms of the kind Australia has implemented have long been recognised 
as economically desirable by most economists, but have typically faced strong 
opposition. Various obstacles to reform outlined in Box 2 are undoubtedly not 
unique to Australia, although its particular federal system of government can pose 
additional challenges in securing nationally beneficial reform. 
 
Box 2:  Obstacles to structural reform 
1. The costs of reform are concentrated on particular groups, whereas the benefits are 
more diffuse. 
2. The potential winners from reform tend to be (rationally) poorly informed about the 
tradeoffs. 
3. Bureaucratic structures are typically aligned with particular sections of the economy 
or community. 
4. The costs of reform tend to be front-loaded, whereas the benefits arise over time. 
5. Multiple jurisdictions increase the difficulty of achieving nationally consistent 
approaches. 
Source: Banks (2005). 
 
 
A range of other factors also come into play: political commitment and leadership, 
reform champions within the bureaucracy (particularly in central agencies) and pro-
reform lobbies in the broader community.  
However, Australia appears to differ from other countries in fashioning domestic 
institutional arrangements expressly to promote and sustain reform by both 
neutralising the power of vested interests and building wider political and 
community support for reform. An institution that is arguably the most distinctive of 
the Australian approach in this respect is the Productivity Commission, and its 
direct forebears, the Industries Assistance Commission and the Industry 
Commission. 
The role of ‘the Commission’ 
While the Commission today is identified with the microeconomic reforms in 
Australia over the past few decades it paradoxically had its origins in an institution 
that had underpinned the industry protection element of the Australian settlement 
for much of the proceeding 50 years (Banks 2005; PC 2003b). The Tariff Board’s 
remit since 1921 was to offset local industry’s ‘margin of cost disadvantage’ against 
imports while avoiding ‘excessive’ protection’, for which its statute provided only      
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vague guidance. Nevertheless, it embedded the role of an independent inquiry and 
advisory body in Australia’s institutional framework, albeit restricted to tariff 
policy. At the Government’s request, the Tariff Board would examine the claims of 
particular industries for increased protection through a public inquiry process, and 
issue public reports with formal recommendations.  
In the mid-1960s, under the combined influence of new leadership, a separate 
public inquiry into Australia’s economic policies (the Vernon Committee) and 
academic work providing an intellectual basis for protection reform (notably by 
Max Corden), the Board began to question the effects on the wider economy of its 
long-standing practice of granting protection to individual industries according to 
need. This was the genesis of an approach which made advancement of the overall 
interests of the Australian community paramount over the interests of particular 
firms, industries or sectors. 
All this came together in the blueprint commissioned by the Government for a new 
organisation providing for the development of coordinated policies for improving 
resource allocation and public scrutiny of industry assistance measures and their 
costs (Crawford 1973). The Industries Assistance Commission was designed to 
provide a counterweight to the sectional and other political pressures that militated 
against liberalisation. 
There are three features of the organisation’s design that collectively distinguished 
its contribution: 
–  Independence. The Commission operated under the protection and guidelines 
of its own legislation. It had an arm’s length relationship with government 
which could tell it what to do but not what to say. Its role was purely 
advisory, having no judicial, executive or administrative functions. Members 
of the Commission were appointed for fixed (renewable) terms and could not 
be removed by the government of the day. 
–  Transparency. The Commission was required to hold public hearings and 
release draft reports before finalising its recommendations to government. 
The Commission was also required to prepare an annual report covering its 
operations and analysing the structure of assistance to Australian industry and 
its effects. And the government was obliged to release publicly all 
Commission reports within a specified period. 
–  Community-wide mandate. Guidelines in the legislation stated that the 
Commission should be concerned with improving the efficiency with which 
the economy uses its resources and to take account of the wider interests of 
consumers and users of products affected by its proposals.      
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With some variation, these three features remained fundamental to the role and 
operations of the two organisations that succeeded the IAC; namely the Industry 
Commission (from 1990 to 1998) and today’s Productivity Commission, which was 
established in April 1998. (For a short history of the Commission, see PC 2003b).  
The main differences between the organisations have been in their coverage, which 
has been progressively extended beyond industry assistance matters to cover 
structural reform issues across all sectors of the economy, and in social and 
environmental as well as economic spheres. Around 80 per cent of the IAC’s 
inquiry reports concerned assistance for manufacturing industries. These days, 
around 80 per cent of Productivity Commission inquiries relate to cross-sectoral, 
infrastructure, social and environmental policy issues. Box 3 illustrates the breadth 
of matters that the Productivity Commission has addressed in recent years. 
The Commission’s contribution to government policy 
The Commission assists the reform effort of governments in a number of ways. 
•  The Commission provides well researched advice on structural reform that is 
impartial and concerned with the longer term interests of the community as a 
whole. The Commission’s processes ensure that the arguments of vested 
interests are subjected to rigorous scrutiny, weakening their influence if they 
don’t hold up. Moreover, the robustness of the Commission’s final analysis and 
advice is increased through its own processes, draft reports and the like, which 
test its preliminary views through public input and feedback. 
•  The Commission’s transparent inquiry  processes — including public 
submissions, hearings, draft and final reports — allow governments to gauge at 
arms length the likely reactions of the community and interest groups to different 
policy approaches. This can reduce the prospect of unanticipated responses from 
these groups forcing policy reversals. 
•  Governments can use the Commission’s reports and analyses in making the case 
for policy changes, or in resisting pressures to introduce policy measures that 
would be costly nationally. 
•  The Commission’s public inquiry processes and reporting can in themselves 
engender a wider awareness within the community of the costs of existing 
policies and the benefits from reform. In effect, the Commission helps 
enfranchise those interests who would benefit most from reform, by alerting 
them to the costs they are currently bearing, and by providing a ready public 
forum in which to put their case.      
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Box 3:  A selection of Productivity Commission studies 
Trade liberalisation/industry assistance 
•  Review of Australia’s general tariff 
arrangements 
•  Review of automotive assistance 
•  Review of TCF assistance  
•  Pig and pigmeat industries: safeguard 
action against imports 
•  Review of the pharmaceuticals industry 
investment program  
•  Multilateral liberalisation of services trade 
•  Trade and investment effects of 
preferential trading arrangements 
•  Removing tariffs on goods originating from 
Least Developed Countries 
•  International air services 
Productivity studies 
•  Productivity in Australia’s wholesale and 
retail trade 
•  ICT use and productivity 
•  Microeconomic reforms and Australian 
productivity: exploring the links 
•  R&D and Australia’s productivity 
Infrastructure reform issues 
•  Review of the gas access regime 
•  Price regulation of airport services 
•  Telecommunications competition 
regulation 
•  Progress in rail reform 
•  Road and rail freight infrastructure pricing 
Labour market issues 
•  Australia’s health workforce 
•  Independent review of the Job Network 
•  National workers’ compensation and OHS 
arrangements  
•  Non-traditional work in the Australian 
labour market 
•  Work arrangements in container 
stevedoring 
•  Role of training and innovation in 
workplace performance  
Environmental issues 
•  Rural water use and the environment 
•  Energy efficiency  
•  Waste management 
•  Conservation of historic heritage 
•  Pricing of irrigation water 
•  Impact of a foot and mouth disease 
outbreak in Australia  
•  Water quality in the Great Barrier Reef 
•  The environmental performance of 
commercial buildings 
Social issues 
•  Australia’s gambling industries 
•  Indicators of indigenous disadvantage 
•  Social capital 
•  Review of the Disability Discrimination Act 
•  Nursing home subsidies 
•  Inquiry on first home ownership 
Regulatory reviews 
•  Broadcasting  
•  Impact of native vegetation and biodiversity 
regulations 
•  Reform of building regulation 
•  Radiocommunications 
•  Liner cargo shipping 
•  Regulation of the taxi industry 
•  Review of the Prices Surveillance Act 
•  Review of mutual recognition  
•  Review of legislation regulating the 
architectural profession 
Other studies 
•  Impacts of medical technology in Australia 
•  Report on Government Services  
•  Cost recovery by Commonwealth agencies 
•  Resourcing universities 
•  GP compliance costs 
•  Impact of indirect taxes on exporters 
•  Public liability claims management 
•  GTE financial performance      
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The Commission’s impacts on government policy can be demonstrated across a 
range of policy areas. Such a review is necessarily selective and abstracts from 
much of the ‘drama’ along the way. The Productivity Commission’s predecessors 
went through some difficult times, facing strong opposition from sections of 
industry and the union movement, as well as within government itself. At the same 
time, it had its supporters. They included some industry groups which did not 
always like its findings, but valued the transparency and consultative nature of its 
processes. And, as noted above, successive governments from both sides of politics 
have seen sufficient value in the institution to re-new and expand its mandate over 
the last 30 years. 
Reforming industry protection and assistance 
High level political judgements on the Commission’s contribution to government 
policy on industry protection reforms spanning three decades accord it a significant 
role. At the time of the formation of the Industry Commission in 1989, the then 
Treasurer stated: 
The new Industry Commission (IC) will further the important role that the IAC has 
played in the structural adjustment process in Australia. It will build on the IAC’s 
earlier work which was instrumental in awakening the community to the enormous 
costs of many industry assistance policies. … As an institution, the IAC has been an 
important force, building community awareness of the need for Australian industry to 
be outward looking and internationally competitive. (IAC 1989, p. 15) 
More recently, the current Prime Minister commented on the Commission’s long 
term contribution to trade and industry assistance policy formulation in the 
following terms: 
The dynamic supporting trade liberalisation in democracies will only succeed if 
communities in each country believe it’s in their interests to liberalise. In the Australian 
context, the work of the Productivity Commission and its predecessors … has been 
fundamental to building and maintaining Australian public understanding of the 
benefits of greater openness to international competition … Because of the 
Government’s belief in the robustness and transparency of the Australian institutional 
framework, we have regularly advocated the Productivity Commission as a model for 
other countries to adopt. If other countries could adopt similar transparent institutional 
responses, public opinion would be better informed on the cost of trade barriers, and 
support would be built for good policies in broader areas of industry protection. 
(Howard 2003)   
Notwithstanding these endorsements, the realities of tariff reform were of slow and 
chequered progress following the 25 per cent tariff cut of 1973 through until the 
general tariff reduction program of 1988 (Figure 3). The Commission had to work 
in a world of piecemeal assistance inquiries — often only parts of industry were      
  POLICY DETERMINANTS 
OF PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH IN AUSTRALIA 
17 
 
referred to it at any one time. Strong substitution possibilities in production and/or 
consumption and adjustment considerations constrained the pace at which 
assistance levels could be lowered. And the Commission’s assistance 
recommendations, even when (typically) implemented by the Government, could be 
quickly overtaken through rounds of ‘temporary’ safeguard action against imports, 
often in the form of import quotas. (The main institutional mechanism for this, the 
Temporary Assistance Authority, focused on ‘injury’ to domestic producers, not the 
wider effects of temporary protection on user industries, consumers and the 
community at large.) Although average levels of assistance for manufacturing 
industries declined gradually in the decade after the 25 per cent tariff cut, disparities 
in assistance levels, and thus potential resource misallocation costs, increased.  
Arguably, the Commission’s most crucial contribution during this period was its 
educative role — quantifying levels of assistance to industry and explaining to the 
broader community how assistance provided to one industry can harm producers in 
other Australian industries, as well as consumers and taxpayers.  
How did it do this? Among other things, the Commission developed the use of 
effective rates of assistance, building on the pioneering work of Australia’s 
Professor Max Corden. Tariffs, quotas and subsidies on inputs and outputs were 
assessed so as to show the net effect on an industry’s level of assistance and the 
overall structure of protection in Australia. Over the years the Commission 
extended its assistance measurement framework to encompass agricultural and 
mining industries and budgetary assistance to services. The reporting on assistance 
to Australian industries continues to the present day in the Commission’s annual 
Trade & Assistance Review which, as the WTO’s  World Trade Report 2006 
observed, is one of only three such detailed, comprehensive and publicly accessible 
reports world-wide (the others are by the European Commission and the German 
Ministry of Finance). 
Emboldened by improved economic conditions in the early 1980s, the Government 
sent the Commission a broad reference asking for options for general reductions in 
protection. While the report had no impact when the Commission reported in 1982, 
it became a key reference later in the decade in the lead up to the 1988 
announcement of general phased tariff reductions. A further general reduction 
program was announced in 1991. The fact that a government may not initially 
accept or act on key recommendations in a particular Commission report does not 
mean that that report has no influence in the longer term. 
The most contentious of the Commission’s industry assistance reports down the 
years have typically concerned Australia’s highly assisted manufacturing industries 
— passenger motor vehicles and TCF. A measure of the Commission’s ultimate 
success in helping to shape long term assistance policy for these industries was      
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government endorsement of the Commission’s findings on post-2005 tariff 
reductions and transitional assistance for the automotive industry (following the 
Commission’s 2002 inquiry report) and the acceptance of the Commission’s 
preferred tariff option for the TCF industries and quantum of transitional assistance 
post-2005 (following the Commission’s 2003 TCF inquiry report).  
Assistance to Australia’s rural industries has varied considerably, from little or no 
assistance (as with beef), to substantial assistance to industries such as tobacco and 
market milk. The policy instruments of choice in agriculture in the post-war period 
were regulatory — domestic pricing arrangements, anti-competitive statutory 
marketing arrangements and restrictions on substitute products — supplemented by 
various tax concessions, output and input subsidies and assistance for promotion 
activities, with tariffs playing a relatively minor role.  
Around one fifth of the inquiries conducted by the IAC/IC during the 1970s and 
1980s concerned assistance arrangements for agricultural industries. As with 
manufacturing protection, the reform process was incremental and spanned decades, 
but few remnants of the original industry-specific policy settings remain — the 
statutory monopoly on wheat exports being the most significant exception.  
Against this background of reform, assistance issues for Australia’s manufacturing 
and agricultural industries have not figured prominently in the Productivity 
Commission’s work. Nevertheless, its influence is evident in government 
acceptance of Commission recommendations: 
•  for the automotive and TCF industries (noted above); 
•  for a substantial liberalisation of the regulatory regime for international air 
services (though not to offer unrestricted access to Australia’s major airports or 
to abolish cabotage restrictions); 
•  to eschew tariff and quota options for safeguard action against pigmeat imports 
in 1999 and to opt, instead, for adjustment assistance for pig producers; 
•  not to provide special assistance to citrus growers under competitive pressure but 
to address the trade negotiation, market access, export control and other issues 
identified by the Commission; and 
•  to reorient pharmaceutical industry assistance to R&D, where spillover benefits 
would generate net benefits for Australia as a whole. 
Nevertheless, tariff reform remains incomplete. In 2000 the Australian Government 
deferred implementing the Commission’s recommendation to reduce the remaining 
general tariffs of 5 per cent to zero, preferring to delay removal until a time 
‘consistent with trade and fiscal objectives’.      
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Reforming economic infrastructure 
With Australia’s tariff walls falling, policy impediments in other parts of the 
economy began to attract the attention of governments and industries under 
increased competitive pressure. The IAC’s 1989 report on government (non-tax) 
charges highlighted the significance of government supplied inputs to industry and 
the adverse effects of inefficiencies in service provision on business 
competitiveness. The report had the long-term impact of widening the 
microeconomic reform agenda beyond industry assistance and initiating a series of 
references to the Commission on economic infrastructure services covering energy 
generation and distribution, water, rail, ports and postal services. The Commission 
helped establish a widely adopted reform program for government business 
enterprises encompassing: 
•  the removal of barriers to competition (for example, legislative barriers to entry) 
and structural separation of activities to promote competition; 
•  institutional and administrative reforms designed to enhance commercial focus 
and accountability; 
•  privatisation, when appropriate, to promote on-going cost reductions; and 
•  other measures, such as pricing reform. 
The Commission was the secretariat to a committee of all governments 
(Commonwealth, State and Territory) which began monitoring the economic and 
financial performance of government enterprises providing economic infrastructure 
services so as to provide benchmarks against which their performance could be 
benchmarked. The Productivity Commission has maintained this regular 
benchmarking, latterly enhancing it with analysis of the scope to improve external 
governance frameworks and capital management practices. This work continues to 
be supported by governments in all jurisdictions and the benchmarking outcomes 
are used in political, media and community debate on the performance of these 
service providers. 
Governments have embraced one of the principal policy messages arising from a 
series of Productivity Commission reports on the regulation of economic 
infrastructure — the need to rebalance the emphasis in the regulatory frameworks 
away from achieving immediate gains for users and consumers to also facilitate 
efficient investment in new or augmented facilities. More specifically, the 
Australian Government:  
•  broadly endorsed Commission recommendations on rail reform in areas of 
Commonwealth responsibility  but deferred consideration of other 
recommendations relating to State or joint responsibilities, preferring to see      
20  POLICY DETERMINANTS 
OF PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH IN AUSTRALIA 
 
 
whether existing reform initiatives could be progressed within existing 
institutional settings; 
•  endorsed the thrust of the Commission’s recommendations to retain 
telecommunications-specific parts of the competition policy regime, speed up 
dispute resolution processes and provide greater upfront certainty for investors 
(though rejecting other recommendations); 
•  endorsed, together with the States and Territories, the majority of the 
Commission’s recommendations on the national access regime for essential 
infrastructure;  
•  implemented all major elements of the Commission’s  preferred approach for 
light-handed regulatory regime for airport services involving a probationary 
period of price monitoring;  
•  accepted all the Commission’s recommendations on the economic regulation of 
harbour towage services, with only minor modifications to the suggested price 
monitoring regime; and  
•  with the agreement of the inter-jurisdictional Ministerial Council on Energy, 
supported the Commission’s key recommendations for reforming the gas access 
regime. 
Improving the functioning of the labour market 
In the early 1990s the Industry Commission’s first direct foray into industrial 
relations issues was its inquiry on impediments to regional industry adjustment and 
on what needed to be done to help people and businesses within regions adjust to 
pressures for change (IC 1993). A central theme of the Commission’s report was the 
difficulty that uniformity in policy and regulation can pose for regional adjustment 
and development, given the diversity among Australia’s regions.  
The Commission focused its analysis on arrangements that were amenable to 
government or community action, including aspects of labour market regulation; 
social security and taxation systems; problems with government provision of 
infrastructure services; and confused responsibilities across tiers of government. It 
was the Commission’s findings on labour adjustment that were most contentious, 
provoking a strong negative reaction from unions and welfare groups in particular. 
Nevertheless, the Government considered the report in the context of its white paper 
on employment and growth and the Commission’s report provided a focus for 
continuing public debate on enterprise bargaining and labour force flexibility. 
One of the early tasks given the new Productivity Commission was to identify 
restrictive work practices that added to the cost of doing business. The first of these      
  POLICY DETERMINANTS 
OF PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH IN AUSTRALIA 
21 
 
reports — on container stevedoring —highlighted the productivity sapping nature of 
the complex, inflexible and prescriptive work arrangements on Australia’s 
waterfront. The key impediments identified by the Commission were subsequently 
addressed in waterfront enterprise bargains. Similarly, the Commission’s analyses 
of productivity restricting work practices in coal mining and meat processing were 
addressed in subsequent decisions by the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission and government legislation on the meat ‘tally’ system. 
The Commission has also influenced government policy making on broad labour 
market issues. For example: 
•  The Job Network, established in 1998, is one of the first comprehensive attempts 
internationally to apply market principles to the provision of active labour 
market assistance to disadvantaged job seekers. The Government credited the 
Commission’s 2002 review as being ‘authoritative’ and implemented a range of 
its recommendations but also deferred addressing some key ones until 
employment services policy further evolved. 
•  A 2004 Productivity Commission review into national frameworks for workers’ 
compensation and occupational health and safety, identified clear net benefits in 
creating a national framework, but this was not fully supported by the Australian 
Government at the time. Nevertheless, it has since set about creating an opt-in 
nation-wide alternative to State-based regimes. 
•  And just recently, all Australian governments (through the Council of Australian 
Governments, COAG) announced substantial agreement with the institutional, 
regulatory and funding measures the Commission proposed to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of Australia’s health workforce and to improve its 
distribution. In addition, COAG decided that the Commission should be asked to 
conduct another review in five year’s time.  
Reforming regulation 
Almost all of the matters referred to the Commission for investigation involve some 
form of regulation. However, an important element of the Commission’s workload 
following the 1995 inter-jurisdictional agreement on National Competition Policy 
was a stream of inquiries reviewing anti-competitive regulation. Many of these 
involved economic infrastructure, discussed above, but also included: 
•  radiocommunications, where the Government accepted most of the 
Commission’s recommendations for reform of radiofrequency spectrum 
regulation, although it postponed consideration of issuing licences with perpetual 
tenure and rejected some other recommendations;       
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•  broadcasting, which the Australian Government largely ignored even though the 
Commission’s 2000 report continues to be used extensively in political, media 
and community debate on foreign ownership of print, radio and television media, 
cross-media rules and the regulation of digital and analogue television; 
•  regulation of the architectural profession, where the States and Territories 
rejected the Commission’s preferred option to repeal Architects Acts and remove 
statutory certification, but supported a range of recommendations to remove 
anti-competitive elements from their legislation regulating architects; and  
•  prices surveillance legislation, where the Government accepted the 
recommendation to repeal the Prices Surveillance Act but decided to retain more 
extensive price controls and prices in the Trade Practices Act than recommended 
by the Commission. 
In conjunction with these NCP-related inquiries, the Commission has been asked to 
report on a wide range of other regulatory issues. For example, the Australian 
Government: 
•  accepted all of the Commission’s recommendations on native vegetation and 
biodiversity regulation and indicated that it would pursue implementation of 
them by the States and Territories though COAG processes; 
•  agreed to implement the Commission’s principal findings on building regulation 
reform through a new intergovernmental agreement on the Australian Building 
Codes Board and the Building Code of Australia; 
•  agreed with the Commission’s key recommendations in its smash repair and 
insurance inquiry on the development and nature of a voluntary code of conduct 
for the industries; and 
•  together with the New Zealand Government, endorsed the Commission’s work 
program to more closely integrate the competition and consumer protection 
regimes of the two countries. 
In addition to its inquiry role, the Commission has within it a separate unit charged 
with the role of improving regulation making processes. The Office of Regulation 
Review provides advice to government departments and regulatory agencies on the 
development of regulatory proposals and monitors compliance with the 
Government’s mandatory requirements for the preparation of a Regulation Impact 
Statement (RIS) for major proposals affecting business or restricting competition. 
The Commission reports on these activities annually in its publication, Regulation 
and its Review. In August 2006 the Treasurer announced that, as part of the 
Australian Government’s new regulatory reform agenda, the Office will have its 
role and responsibilities enhanced and upgraded and become the Office of Best 
Practice Regulation. The RIS process is being strengthened, in particular through      
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greater oversight of and attention to the cost-benefit, risk and compliance cost 
analysis accompanying regulatory proposals. 
Contributing to environmental and social policy formulation 
The Commission has a long history of addressing environmental and natural 
resource issues in its inquiry program. Examples pre-dating the Productivity 
Commission include reports on mining and mineral processing, fisheries, water, 
recycling, the discharge of pulp and paper wastes, greenhouse gas emissions, 
ecologically sustainable land management and urban transport.  
The Productivity Commission has continued this focus through, for example, its 
1999 inquiry report on the implementation of ecologically sustainable development 
by Commonwealth departments and agencies — in response to which the 
Government agreed to integrate ESD principles into decision making and agency 
reporting and to improve data collection — and its 2003 report on the impacts of 
native vegetation and biodiversity regulation (noted above). The Commission’s 
report on industries, land use and water quality in the Great Barrier Reef was jointly 
acknowledged by the Commonwealth and Queensland governments as a valuable 
contribution to policy development and implementation for what is the world’s 
largest World Heritage Area.  
More recently, the Government announced agreement with all of the Commission’s 
recommendations on the private cost effectiveness of improving energy efficiency 
and that it would work with the States to consider the Commission’s findings and 
analysis. Major reports — on the conservation of Australia’s historic heritage; on 
waste management; and on the feasibility of establishing market mechanisms to 
provide incentives for greater investment in rural water use efficiency and for 
dealing with environmental externalities — have only recently been completed and 
are yet to have a government response. (In addition to its inquiry work, the 
Commission has a strong research program that has contributed, inside and outside 
government, to environmental policy development.) 
There has been a growing recognition that the economic analytical tools and 
community-wide focus of the Productivity Commission and its predecessors can 
contribute to policy issues with important social dimensions. Early examples in this 
regard include rural adjustment, charities and private health insurance. The 
Commission’s 1997 inquiry into private health insurance, for example, led to 
changes to regulation which prevented health funds discriminating on the basis of 
age. Thought by many to be sacrosanct, the Commission showed that it led to 
adverse selection problems and ultimate inequities, with younger people not 
contributing to the pool causing premiums for remaining (generally older) members      
24  POLICY DETERMINANTS 
OF PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH IN AUSTRALIA 
 
 
to spiral up, resulting in further exits. The Commission’s recommendations — that 
people entering insurance late pay higher premiums than those who enter early — 
were later adopted by the Government. 
The Productivity Commission’s 1999 report on Australia’s gambling industries 
broke new ground. It provided an analysis not only of the regulatory framework for 
the gambling industries, but also the social costs and benefits of these industries, 
including a comprehensive assessment of the extent and impacts of problem 
gambling. The Prime Minister commented: 
I commend to all people who are concerned to achieve a balance in social policy a 
careful study of the Productivity Commission’s final report … it represents the first 
really comprehensive analysis of the gambling industry in Australia. I think it’s a very 
balanced attempt to strike the right pitch … I think it makes very interesting and very 
compelling reading. (Howard 1999, p. 2) 
A further recent example of the Commission’s contribution to social policy 
formulation was its 2004 review of the Disability Discrimination Act. The 
Government subsequently accepted the majority of the Commission’s 
recommendations, including many of the more significant ones.   
Through performance monitoring, the Commission also helps governments achieve 
their social objectives. Since 1993 the Commission has been providing the 
secretariat to the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service 
Provision. The Committee is charged with monitoring the equity, effectiveness and 
efficiency of a wide range of government services including hospitals, schools, 
community services and public housing. The annual  Report on Government 
Services is widely used by governments at all levels, service agencies and the wider 
community. It has improved accountability and enabled more analysis by 
governments and agencies of variations in performance, with consequent benefits in 
the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery. Since 2002 the Commission has 
also assisted in the preparation of the reports  Overcoming Indigenous 
Disadvantage: Key Indicators. A key task of this reporting is to identify indicators 
that demonstrate the impact of programs and policies on outcomes for one of the 
most disadvantaged sections of the Australian community. The two reports to date 
are acknowledged within government and among Indigenous leaders as creating the 
framework in which progress in reducing the disparities between Indigenous and 
other Australians can be assessed.  
Improving the information base for policy making 
The Commission’s contributions to government policy also encompass those of its 
analytical and modelling outputs which influence the policy agenda rather than      
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specific policy outcomes. The role played by the Commission’s early use of 
effective rates of assistance to industry in helping to reshape the tariff debate in 
Australia has already been noted. The Commission’s promotion and use of general 
equilibrium modelling to demonstrate interdependencies between industries and the 
importance of taking the indirect effects of policy into account was another means 
of advancing the reform agenda. Examples of a range of the Commission’s 
contributions include: 
•  Commission modelling in the late 1980s suggested that across-the-board tariff 
liberalisation and some other microeconomics reforms could increase Australia’s 
GDP by some $16 billion, or $1600 per household per year (1988 dollars). These 
headline grabbing numbers proved important in the subsequent successful 
implementation of reforms. 
•  In seeking to reach agreement on National Competition Policy in 1995, State and 
Territory governments expressed concern about whether they would share 
adequately in the gains from the reforms that they would undertake. As a result, 
the Commission was asked to quantify the impact of implementing a range of 
reforms, including the impact on government revenue. The findings of this 
research reinforced the emerging consensus on proceeding with competition 
policy reforms, and laid the basis for a fuller understanding of the gains from 
those reforms and for competition policy payments by the Commonwealth to the 
States and Territories. 
•  Claims by opponents of national competition policy that depopulation and other 
problems in regional Australia were attributable to the policy were examined by 
the Commission in 1999. The Commission found that longer term factors — 
including technological advances, changing consumer tastes and lifestyle 
preferences, and declining prices for agricultural commodities — were primarily 
responsible and that National Competition Policy should not be made the 
‘scapegoat’. Further, modelling undertaken as part of the inquiry indicated that 
NCP was likely to increase net income in all but one region.  
•  Various streams of Commission research provide analysis and information that 
help governments both promote the benefits of reform and respond to the critics 
of reform. The Commission’s widely cited analysis of productivity trends and 
the links to microeconomic reform and the Commission’s sophisticated analysis 
of the role of non-traditional employment in today’s labour market are two 
examples. (See Dee 2005 for other examples of the contribution of Commission 
modelling to policy impacts.)  
After more than two decades of seemingly relentless microeconomic reform, some 
might have supposed that little more by way of structural policy remained to be 
done. In April 2004 the Australian Government asked the Commission to review      
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National Competition Policy and report on further opportunities to remove 
impediments to efficiency and enhance competition. The Commission showed that 
productivity and price changes in key infrastructure sectors during the 1990s had 
increased Australia’s GDP by some 2.5 per cent and that the benefits had been 
widely spread across the community (PC 2005a). But the Commission also 
highlighted known challenges facing Australia, including the economic and fiscal 
pressures arising from an ageing population with its implications for workforce 
growth and public spending on health and aged care (PC 2005b). Notwithstanding 
improvements to Australia’s economic performance in recent years, the 
Commission’s review of NCP pointed to performance gaps in a number of areas 
where further nationally coordinated reforms could provide substantial pay-offs to 
the community (Box 4). 
 
Box 4  The Productivity Commission’s proposed agenda from its 
review of NCP 
•  In a number of reform areas, national coordination will be critical to good outcomes. 
These areas — some of which were encompassed by NCP — should be brought 
together in a new reform program with common governance and monitoring 
arrangements. Priorities for the new program include: 
–  strengthening the operation of the national electricity market; 
–  enhancing water allocation and trading regimes to better address scarcity and 
negative environmental impacts; 
–  delivering a more efficient and integrated freight transport system; 
–  addressing uncertainty and policy fragmentation in relation to greenhouse gas 
abatement policies; 
–  improving the effectiveness and efficiency of consumer protection policies; and 
–  introducing a more targeted legislation review mechanism, while strengthening 
arrangements to screen any new legislative restrictions on competition. 
•  An ‘overarching’ policy review of the entire health system should be the first step in 
developing a nationally coordinated reform program for this sector to address 
problems that are inflating costs, reducing service quality and limiting access to 
services. 
•  National action is needed to re-energise reform in the vocational education and 
training area. 
•  A future review could identify areas of natural resource management (beyond water 
and greenhouse gases) where the pay-offs from new nationally coordinated reform 
could be high.  
While reform is important in other areas, including industrial relations and taxation, 
there would be less pay-off from new nationally coordinated initiatives in these areas. 
Source: PC (2006) 
 
      
  POLICY DETERMINANTS 
OF PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH IN AUSTRALIA 
27 
 
COAG drew on the Commission’s analysis of the benefits of past NCP reforms and 
important elements of COAG’s new National Reform Agenda reflect the 
Commission’s recommendations and approach. Further, the Commission has been 
asked to assist COAG progress its reform agenda by reporting by the end of 2006 
on: 
•  the implementation of efficient pricing of road and rail freight infrastructure 
given concerns that current charging arrangements might be resulting in 
distorted modal choices and inefficient infrastructure investment decisions; and 
•  the potential economic and revenue impacts of the National Reform Agenda so 
as to help governments better understand the scale and distribution of the pay-off 
from competition, regulatory and human capital streams of reform to which all 
Australia’s governments are now committed.  
Conclusions 
These observations on the Commission’s contribution to government policy should 
not be interpreted as suggesting that the Commission has been the sole, or even 
main, driver of trade liberalisation and wider microeconomic reforms. Besides the 
role of other review bodies — particularly for financial, tax and competition policy 
reforms — governments and ministers have championed and taken forward the 
reform agenda. Moreover, as for all such bodies, the Commission’s role is 
informational and advisory. It is reliant on others to initiate much of its work and to 
consider and implement worthwhile reforms.  
Nevertheless, any fair reading of the record shows that the Commission has made a 
difference to the microeconomic reforms implemented in Australia over the last two 
decades. The Commission’s record in having its findings and recommendations 
accepted by government is a good one. And while the focus of this paper has largely 
been on government responses to its reports, the Commission’s influence extends 
much wider. As the Commission’s annual reports document, its work is used in 
policy debate by parliamentarians, government agencies, the media, peak business 
and community groups, policy analysts and others. The contribution that a body 
such as the Commission might make in different institutional and policy settings is, 
of course, something for others to judge.      
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